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One can only wonder how many of the attorneys involved in the
19,550 divorces in Florida during 1959,1 deemed it necessary to reflect
on the income tax consequences to their clients. It has been suggested
that "those sections of the Internal Revenue Code dealing with the
taxation of alimony stand as an example of how an area of legal practice
may become tax-dominated." 2
Even if an attorney were to review the code provisions dealing with
alimony, he could still, without more, fall prey to the "traps which
abound for the uncautious and the ill-advised [and which indeed] may
even trip up experienced counsel."3 Furthermore, some tax questions
that arise in divorce may not be specifically answered in sections dealing with alimony.
The purpose of this article is to present to the general practitioner,4 a
discussion of the effect of the federal income tax upon some of the
more common problems associated with alimony and property settlements.
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Prologueto CongressionalAction
As tax advisor to the Secretary of Treasury in 1942, Randolph E.
Paul appeared before the House Ways and Means Committee to explain certain provisions of the then pending Revenue Revision of
1942.r Indicating that high wartime rates made it necessary to eliminate
- B.S.B.A. 1955, LL.B. 1960, University of Florida; LL.M. (in taxation) 1961,
New York University; Member of American Bar Association and Tampa, Florida,
Bar.
1. U.S. BuaAu oF mx CENsus, STATISTICAL ABSTEACr OF = UNan STATm

70 (1962).
2. Brrrnmx, FExrEmaAL INcom, ESTATE N GIr TAXATioN 173 (2d ed. 1958).
3.Home, Tax Pitfalls in Alimony and Separation Payments, 85 TAXES 751
(1957).
4. The term here is meant to imply an attorney who neither specializes in income
taxes nor has had special training in the area.
5. Hearingson the Revenue Revision of 1942 Before the House Committee on
Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1942).
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existing inequities that distorted the tax burden of certain taxpayers, 6
Paul pointed out that "rising tax rates have in some cases absorbed the
entire income of a husband required to pay the tax on his income and
that of the divorced wife."7 He also urged that divorced wives receiving

tax-free alimony "possessed a privileged status under our tax laws
which relieved them of any share of the tax burden."8
To appreciate the full thrust of Paul's arguments and the resulting
legislation, it is necessary to review the pre-1942 treatment of alimony
by the courts and the commissioner. The scope of this article, however,
demands that such reflection into the past be succinct.
The first recorded clash of federal taxation and alimony payments
appears in Gould v. Gould,9 wherein the Supreme Court held that a
"direct" alimony payment was not "income" to the recipient. Immediately, the question of how to treat payments from alimony trusts was
raised. The statutory scheme for taxation of trusts contemplated that
the beneficiaries were to pay the tax on the trust's distributable income.
Was income derived from alimony trusts, therefore, now to be treated
differently than alimony received directly? Treasury officials had difficulty in arriving at a conclusion. 10 Finally in 1931, the government
adopted the position that income from an alimony trust was taxable to
the husband."
The Tax Court's holdings on income from alimony trusts depended
upon the circumstances of the case. A "collateral security" trust insuring
the payments to the wife and involving no irrevocable transfer of title
caused the husband-grantor to be taxed.' 2 The trust income, however,
was taxed to the wife if the husband created an irrevocable trust and
13
retained no rights therein.
Confusion on the subject was also apparent among the federal
courts. In Douglas v. Willcuts,' 4 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
taxed to the husband the income of an alimony trust created by him for

6. Id. at 87.
7. Id. at 92.
8. Ibid. Paul had previously raised this argument in a 1939 law review article.
See Paul, FiveYears with Douglasv. Willcuts, 53 HLv.L. REv. 1, 3, n.6 (1939).
9. 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
10. Within one year, they first held income from an alimony trust taxable to the
husband, O.D. 399, 2 Gum. BUL. 156 (1920), and then reversed themselves and
held such income taxable to the wife, O.D. 1092, 5 Cr. BULL. 190 (1921).
11. In Mary R. Spencer, 20 B.T.A. 58 (1930), the Government was unsuccessful
in an attempt to tax the wife; therefore, it changed its position in I.T. 2628, XI-1
Cum. BULL. 34 (1931).
12. Frank B. Turner, 28 B.T.A. 91 (1933), af'd per curian 71 F.2d 1018 (2d
Cir. 1934).
13. S. A. Lynch, 23 B.T.A. 435 (1931).
14. 73 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1934), aff'd 296 U.S. 1 (1935).
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the benefit of his wife. The basic lesson of Willcuts, however, was not
that the income from all alimony trusts should be taxable to the husband. Rather, it stood for the proposition that the doctrine of constructive receiptr5 requires taxing the trust income to the husband if the
creation of the alimony trust did not release the husband from the duty
of supporting his wife. The net result of the decision and its subsequent
judicial interpretations' 6 was that the tax incidence of income from an
alimony trust was made to depend upon the various state laws. Consequently, two husbands divorced from their wives in two different
states, but under similar decrees, were subject to different tax burdens.
The tax result depended upon the existence or non-existence of a continuing legal obligation, under applicable state law, to support the ex17
wives.
This, then, was the status of the law of alimony taxation which,
when combined with the high wartime rates being invoked in 1942, was
the basis of Paul's plea to eliminate "existing inequities which distort the
tax burden of certain taxpayers."' 8
Had alimony trusts been the only facet of the problem, a statutory
solution would have been simple. Congress, in order to treat all trust
income equally, merely had to provide that income from alimony trusts
would be taxable to the wife.' 9 It would have been neither politically
expedient nor equitable, however, for Congress to have ceased its
labors at that point. Such a cessation would have discriminated between
those financially able to telescope their obligation by a lump sum transfer into trust and those obligated to pay alimony over a period of time.
In an attempt to eliminate these discriminations-for example, between
the various holdings in the alimony trust cases and also between alimony
trusts and direct payments-Congress, for the first time, provided in the
15. In affirming the Eighth Circuit in Willcuts, the Supreme Court aptly described this doctrine: "[T]he net income of the trust fund, which was paid to the
wife under the decree, stands substantially on the same footing as though [the husband] had received the income personally and had been required by decree to make
the payment directly." 296 U.S. 1, 9 (1935).
16. Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U.S. 149 (1940) (wherein the Court, not convinced
that the Iowa courts were without power "to modify alimony awarded in a lump sum
or a property settlement ratified by the divorce decree," held the husband taxable.)
Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69 (1940) (wherein the Court, having found that the
Nevada court could not modify the decree, held the wife taxable on the income).
Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U.S. 80 (1940) (wherein the Court held the husband
taxable because he failed to show that a New York court could not modify the
decree).
17. The husband could have been taxable if he voluntarily assumed such continuing legal obligation. Alsop v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1937), cert.
denied302 U.S. 767 (1938).
18. Hearingson Revenue Revision of 1942, supranote 5, at 87.
19. Int.Rev. Code of 1939, §171 (now INT.REv. CoDE oF 1954, §682).
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Internal Revenue Code2 o for the taxation of alimony to the wife2 l and a
corresponding deduction for the husband. 22
Statutory Scheme
Having remained silent on the subject for twenty-nine years, Congress quickly became effusive on the question of taxing alimony. No
less than four code sections are required reading for the complete picture.
Section 7123 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides for the
inclusion of alimony in income under certain circumstances. Once a decision is made that the alimony is taxable under section 71, section 21524
then provides for its corresponding deductibility by the payor. The tax
consequences of the use of the trust vehicle to provide alimony are set
forth in sections 68225 and 71.
Section 71-Legal Prerequisite.Under the 1939 Code, before the

alimony provisions could come into play, either a decree of divorce or a
legal separation under a decree of separate maintenance
was required.
26
No other type of legal relationship would suffice.
20. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §22(k) (now INT.1Ev. CoDE oF 1954, §71). During
the hearings on the 1942 proposals, only one reported witness opposed the plan to
tax alimony to the wife. One of this witness's arguments was that the provisions would
encourage the breakup of the family. Seemingly, the committee summarily dismissed
the idea that a provision of the Internal Revenue Code could affect the divorce rate.
Hearingson Revenue Revision of 1942, supra note 5, at 2158. Yet, ten years later, a
noted tax attorney, while discussing the economic value of the split income provisions
to the husband, said, "this may be the principal reason why the nation's divorce
rate has dropped since the income splitting privilege was adopted nationally in
1948." University of Chicago, Conference on Divorce 18, Feb. 29, 1952.
These same hearings provide us with another possible reason for the legislation.
Congressman John D. Dingell, after an emotionally charged exchange between himself and the witness referred to above, summed up his feelings on the whole matter
by saying, "they [wives] not only come into court and attempt to prove their cases,
but they prove them, and get their alimony, and I think it is just an infernal racket
and it ought at least to be taxed, and as far as I am concerned it is going to be taxed."
Hearingson Revenue Revision of 1942, supra note 5,at 2164. (Emphasis added.)
21. For simplicity, the person paying the alimony has been and will be referred
to as "husband" and the person receiving the alimony, as "wife." See INr. lEv.
CODE OF 1954, §7701(a)(17).
22. See INr. 1Ev. CODE: OF 1954, §215, which does not come into the picture
until the question whether the alimony isor isnot required to be included inthe
wife's gross income has been answered.
28. Int. Rev. Code of 1939,§22(k).
24. Int.Rev. Code of 1939, §23(u).
25. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §171. The fourth section is §7701(a) (17). See note
21 supra,
26. Thus, in Ben Myerson, 10 T.C. 729 (1948), a voluntary separation sans a
court decree was held to be insufficient. InJoseph C. Brightbill, 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mean
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Thus, prior to 1954, alimony pendente lite, payments under an interlocutory divorce decree, support payments, and payments under a
separation agreement were neither includible in the wife's gross income
nor deductible by the husband. With the passage of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code, however, alimony and separate maintenance payments,
assuming certain other requirements were met, were placed in three
taxable classifications under section 71(a):
(1) payments made under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance (including payments made pursuant to a written instrument
27
incident to such divorce or separation),
(2) payments made under a written separation agreement, 28
(8) payments made under a decree for support.29
Assuming a legal status under one of the above classifications, the payments received will be taxable to the wife if they are: 30
(a) "periodic" and not "installment,"
(b) in discharge of the husband's legal obligation to support
31
his wife as a result of their marriage.
Payments for Less Than Ten Years--"Periodic or Installment The
provision by which Congress has chosen to express the requirement for
the taxation of alimony is deceptively simple. In fact, one noted author
83 (1949), aff'd per curiam 178 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1949), a husband was denied a
deduction when his payments were under a separation agreement without a divorce
despite the fact that he had subsequently obtained a divorce. If, however, under the
Brightbillfacts, the parties bad provided that the separation agreement was to survive a divorce whether incorporated in itor not, seemingly the amount would be
taxable to the wife and deductible by the husband. See Commissioner v. Moses, 214
F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 913 (1955).
27. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §71(a)(1).
28. h4T. 1Ev. CoDE oF 1954, §71(a)(2). Although this section requires that
such agreement be executed after August 16, 1954, (date 1954 Code was enacted)
a pre-1954 agreement may be modified to bring it within this section. See, Treas.
Reg. §1.71-1(b) (2) (1957); Rev. Rul. 56-418, 1956-2 Crax. BuLL.27. Note, however, that such modification must be "material."
29. INT. REv. CODE or 1954, §71(a) (8). Seemingly, the section requires that
the payments be made pursuant to a decree entered after March 1, 1954. Treas. Reg.
§1.71-1(b) (3) (ii) (1957) provide, however, that "any decree which is altered or
modified by a court order entered after March 1, 1954 will be treated as a decree
entered after such date."
30. If the payments are made under §71(a) (2) [Written Separation Agreement]
or under §71(a) (3) [Decree for Support], the provisions for taxing alimony to the
wife are not applicable if the husband and wife fie a "joint return."
81. Cases under this requirement arise too infrequently to justify delving into
this area. For such a case see Maurice Fixler, 25 T.C. 1318 (1956), acq. 1956-2
CUM. BuLL.5. For a full discussion of this problem see 5 MErTms, LAw or FaDmruL
NcOiME TA XATON,§31A.02 (1956). For a discussion concerning payments under
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has opined that the alimony sections "have engendered a surprising
volume of litigation."32 One court has ventured a possible answer for the
extensive litigation over which label-"periodic" or "installment"-should
be placed on payments made under divorce or separation decrees. After
reviewing the statutory requirements of section 71 (c) ,33 the court noted
that "[A]ll of this is easy [and] said rapidly. But when the general rules
are set down on the varying provisions . . . difficult problems arise in

determining whether a given payment is to be assigned to the 'install34
ment' or 'periodic' class."
Perhaps the defect is in the statutory draftsmanship. In section 71 (a)
we are told only that "periodic" payments will be included in a wife's
gross income-assuming, of course, that the payments meet all other
requirements. Congress, however, failed to give us a definition of
"periodic" payments. Instead it chose to tell us that as a general rule
"installment payments discharging a part of an obligation the principal
sum of which is .

.

. specified in the decree, instrument or agreement

shall not be treated as periodic payments."3 5 If, however, the installment
payments are payable over a period of more than ten years from the
date of the decree or agreement, these payments or a portion of them
may qualify as "periodic."36
On the question whether certain payments for ten years or less were
to be included as "periodic," there was, until fairly recently, a cleavage
in the opinions of the Tax Court and some circuit courts of appeals.
a. Tax Court v. Courtsof Appeals
The opinion in 1. B. Steine 3 7 sets the tone for the Tax Court's earlier
feelings on this question. In that case, the divorce decree required the
an agreement entered into by the husband and the ex-wife after the divorce, see

Note, 69 YALE L.J. 153 (1959); ef. Estate of Louis Fabrikant, 89 T.C. -

(1963);

Commissioner v. Walsh, 183 F.2d 803 (D.C. Cir. 1950) affirming 11 T.C. 1093; Cox

v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 226 (3d Cir. 1949) affirming 10 T.C. 955. See also Rev.
Rul. 60-142, 1960-1 Cum. Bu=L. 34.
See also Spec. Rul. Dec. 8, 1944, P-H FED. TAx GUIDE 7859, holding that
payments made under an annulment declaring the marriage void ab initio are not
considered alimony for federal income tax purposes. If, however, a decree of annulment treats the marriage as valid until dissolved, payments made thereunder are
considered alimony. Lily R. Reighley, 17 T.C. 344 (1951).
82. BrrrKE, FnEaA.A. INcomE, ESTATE AND G=T TAXATION 172 (2d ed. 1958).

33. This section sets forth the "statutory" rules as to when "installment" payments will be treated as "periodic" and therefore includible in the wife's gross
income.
34. Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1953), affirming in
part and reversingin part 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1167 (1952).
35. INT. REv. CODEOF 1954, §71(c)(1).
36. This exception which is set forth in §71(c) (2) will be discussed subsequently.
87. 10 T.C. 409 (1948).
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husband to pay $100 monthly until $9,500 was paid, unless his former
wife remarried. The tax-payer argued that the word "obligation" [in
71(c) (1)] meant a definite and unconditional obligation of a specific
sum of money; therefore, because the payments were contingent on the
wife's not remarrying, the obligation was indefinite, uncertain and conditional. The Tax Court felt the legislative history of the alimony provisions indicated that the word "obligation" was used in a general sense
'toinclude even an obligation subject to contingencies that had not yet
occurred. 38 Consequently, the court found that the principal sum was
specified, and refused to allow the husband to deduct the amounts paid
to his ex-wife. The result, insofar as original tax impact is concerned,
would be the same if the divorce decree itself labeled the payments
"periodic" and required the wife to pay the income tax. The Tax Court
quickly headed off any possible ideas that taxpayers could so allocate
the tax burden; it held that Congress imposes the tax and consequently,
such imposition may not be changed by prior agreement.3 9
If the alimony payments were in some way based on a percentage of
the husband's income, the Tax Court's decisions depended on the substance of the divorce decree. Thus, if no specific total sum was mentioned, so that the payments were based solely on a percentage of the
husband's income (for example, ten per cent of the husband's gross
income), the Tax Court found such payments too indefinite to es40
tablish any total fixed sum; therefore, the payments were "periodic."
On the other hand, when a specific sum was stated, subject to change as
net income changes, the court refused to label such payments "periodic." 41 It is difficult to argue that the Tax Court had been inconsistent;
albeit, the decisions created a tax trap for the unwary practitioner. In the
cases in which a specific sum was stated and the contingencies of death,
remarriage, or a change in the husband's net income were involved, the
88. The court restated this conclusion one year later in Estate of Frank P.
Orsatti, 12 T.C. 188 (1949).
39. Frank R. Casey, 12 T.C. 224 (1949). Although it serves no useful purpose
within the scope of this article, to fully discuss this decision other than to cite the
general proposition for which it stands, it is submitted that a court, faced with this
same fact situation today, may decide differently. Thus, the possibility that the
intent of the parties has been circumscribed-husband will not get the deduction and
wife will not pay the tax-may be a sound basis for a suit to reform the agreement.
Thus it may be argued that the total amount to be paid under the original agreement
cannot be calculated; therefore, the payments are "periodic." As to ineffectiveness
of the label "property settlement" on payments which are actually alimony, see
Elizabeth H. Bardwell, 38 T.C. 84 (1963).
40. Roland Keith Young, 10 T.C. 724 (1948) (the amounts to be paid during a
year depended upon the amount of the net income of the husband for the preceding
year); John H. Lee, 10 T.C. 834 (1948) (husband was to pay 33%% of the first
$12,000 of net income and 25%of the excess, if any).
41. Clay W. Prewett, Jr., 22 T.C. 270, rev'd 221 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 1955).
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Tax Court pegged its decisions on the fact that during the taxable year
the contingencies that would avoid the fixed and stated obligation had
not arisen. On the other hand, if the amount of alimony was dependent
solely on the net income of the husband and no specific sum was stated,
a contingency was present at all times and the obligation was neither
fixed nor stated.
In 1953, the circuit courts of appeals were afforded their first opportunity to inspect a Tax Court decision dealing with this area of the
alimony provisions. Under the appellate microscope in Baker v. Commissioner,42 was an agreement that provided, in part, that the husband
pay the ex-wife for'the six years subsequent to the date of the agreement,
unless she died or remarried. 43 Holding fast to the doctrine that it had
set forth in Steine44 and Orsatti,45 the Tax Court found that the amounts
paid were installment payments, each discharging a part of an obligation, the principal sum of which was specified in the decree-that is, not
"periodic."4 "
On review, the Second Circuit felt that the Tax Court had overlooked
the contingencies of death or remarriage. In reversing, the court sidestepped the fact that death of the wife was, actuarially speaking, predictable. It pointed out that even if such fact were important, there was
the further contingency of the wife's remarriage. 47 In the same year, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in a case similar to Baker, partly reversed
a decision48of the Tax Court which once again had held fast to its previous
holdings.
The Tax Court was subsequently presented with an excellent opportunity to retreat gracefully, if so inclined, and to adopt the rationale of
the Second Circuit in Baker. In James M. Fidler,49 the divorce decree
required the husband to pay his wife $800 per month for four years and
five months. It further provided, however, that should the husband's
42. 205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953).
43. The agreement was for $300 per month for the first year and $200 per
month for the next five years.
44. Supranote 37.
45. Supranote 38.
46. F. Ellsworth Baker, 17 T.C. 1610 (1952).
47. The court noted that in an estate tax case it had affirmed the Tax Court's
reliance on American experience tables relating to the chances of continued celibacy
of widows in determining the probability that a particular divorced woman would
take a new spouse. However, in a footnote, the court cited Bohmer v. Commissioner,
153 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1946) for the proposition that "it is well to remember that
the concepts employed in construing one section of a statute are not necessarily
pertinent when construing another with a distinguishable background."
48. Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 34. Other circuits also held
against the Tax Court on this point. See Davidson v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 147
(9th Cir. 1955); Prewett v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 1955).
49. 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1128 (1952), withdrawn and superseded 20 T.C.

1081 (1953).
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radio contract fail to award compensation equal to the amount he was
receiving at the date of divorce, monthly payments to the extent of $800
were to be reduced by a certain proportion. If the husband had no radio
contract whatsoever, monthly payments to the extent of $800 were to be
waived completely.
In a decision handed down before Baker, the Tax Court, following
Steinel and Orsatti and distinguishing John H. Lee and Roland Keith
Young, 0 held the payments to be "installment"; thus, not deductible by
the husband. Following the Baker decision, the Tax Court vacated its
decision in Fidler and handed down a new one 5 1-although with the
same result. The court acknowledged 'that in reversing Baker, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had refused to follow the Tax Court's
rationale in the Steinel case. Be that as it may, the Tax Court felt, despite
its "great respect" for the court of appeals, that upon a careful re-examination of Steinelit could "find no basis in the statute for refusing to give
effect to its plain language."5 2
The difference between the Tax Court and the circuit courts of appeals was a narrow one. Did principal sum, as the Tax Court was
contending, include a fixed and stated obligation that was subject to
contingencies which had not yet arisen? Or did the term imply, as the
courts of appeals were contending, an amount of a fairly definite character, unencumbered with any suggestion of uncertainty?
The 1954 Code added nothing to the alimony provisions to aid in
deciding which contention was correct. Because of the time lag between
the enactment of 'the 1954 Code and the adoption of the regulations
under section 71, the Treasury was on notice that every circuit court
reviewing the question had decided it in line with Baker and against the
Tax Court. Thus, the regulations completely adopted the holdings of the
circuit courts of appeals on this point.53 The regulations provide, in part,
that if payments are to be made over a period of ten years or less, and
such payments are subject to one or more of the contingencies of: death
of either spouse, remarriage of the wife, or change in the economic status
of either spouse,5 4 they are not installment payments discharging an
obligation "the principal sum of which is specified."
Faced with this two-pronged attack-the courts of appeals, on the
one hand and the regulations, on the other-the Tax Court finally sur50. In the Lee and Young cases, supra note 40, the court noted that the amount
of alimony was dependent directly upon the husband's net income and contrary to
the Fidlercase no specified sum was stated.
51. 20 T.C. 1081 (1953).
52. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals later found that up to $300 per month
was "periodic" and thus deductible by the husband. Fidler v. Commissioner, 231
F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1956), modifying 20 T.C. 1081 (1953).
53. Treas. Reg. §.71-1(d) (8) (1957).
54. Rev. Rul. 59-45, 1959-1 Cuim. Bur.r. 666, in effect applies these rules to
cases arising under the 1939 Code.
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rendered. In Helen Stewart Cramer55 the divorce decree required the
husband to pay the wife $250 per month until any one of three events
occurred: (1) The wife "completed three collegiate or university years
of two semesters or three quarters each . . . ."(2) The wife had "been
gainfully employed on a full time basis for not less than one year .
(3) The wife "dies or remarries."
Considering the tenacity with which it had adhered to its interpretation, the capitulation by 'the Tax Court was amazingly "short and
sweet": 56

In the light of the foregoing, [contrary holdings of the circuit
courts of appeals] we have concluded ... that the principle ex-

pressed by the Second Circuit in the Baker case should here be
followed. The contrary principle applied in the Steinel case will
no longer be followed. Accordingly we hold that the payments
here involved are "periodic payments" within the meaning of
Section 71(a) (1) of the 1954 Code.
Thus, there is now unanimity of opinion, between the tribunals and
the regulations, that if payments are to be made over a period of ten
years or less and are subject to one or more of the contingencies of:
death of either spouse, remarriage of the wife, or change in the economic
status of either spouse, they are "periodic." Indeed, according to the
regulations5 7 and Alton F. Lounsbury,5 8 this will be the result whether
the contingencies are set forth in the decree or imposed by local law.
A review of Revenue Ruling 59-190,r 9 indicates that the local law
rule pronounced in the regulations has been so extended as to make
nearly all payments "periodic" and thus includible in the wife's gross
income and deductible by the husband. The ruling holds that if the
courts of a state have the power to modify, alter, or revise alimony payments, or if under local law the obligation to pay alimony terminates
upon the death of either spouse, the requisite contingencies are imposed
by local law so as to make "periodic," alimony payments required to be
paid over a period of less than ten years.
Seemingly, therefore, if a Florida court required a husband to pay
his wife a stated sum per month for a period of less than ten years,
without any specific provision for contingencies,60 the alimony would be
"periodic" on two grounds: (1) the right of the circuit courts to decrease or increase such payments 1 and (2) the holding of the Florida
55. 36 T.C. 1186 (1961).
56. Id.at 1141.
57. Treas. Reg. §1.71-1(d)(3) (1957).
58. 37 T.C.163 (1961).
59. 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 23.
60. These were the facts in Rev. Rul. 59-190. See text at note 59 supra.
61. FLx STAT. §65.15 (1962).
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Supreme Court that, barring an agreement of the husband to bind his
personal representative, the obligation to pay alimony dies with the
person so obligated. 62
The result will be the same if, instead of the court's handing down a
decree that requires the husband to pay alimony to his ex-wife, it adopts
a prior alimony agreement entered into by the parties. The rule in Florida 3 and the general rule6 4 seems to be that, if a state court has the
general power to modify a decree providing alimony or support, the
exercise of the power is not affected by the fact that the decree incorporates the parties' agreement as to alimony payments.6 5 The result is
not the same if the agreement deals strictly with property rights. Such
an agreement, barring fraud, et cetera, will not be modified by a Florida
court.6 6 Should the agreement settle both property rights and alimony
payments, the Florida courts will retain jurisdiction as to alimony por7
tions of the agreement.
b. Court Decisions and Treasury Pronouncements v.
Legislative History
Resort to legislative history is only justified where the face of the
act is inescapably ambiguous and then I think we should not go
beyond Committee Reports, which presumably are well considered and carefully prepared. [Justice Jackson's concurrence in
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert DistillersCorp.]68
I should concur in this result more readily if the Court could
reach it by analysis of the statute instead of by psychoanalysis of
Congress. [Justice Jackson's concurrence in United States v. Public UtilitiesCommission.]6 9
The temptation to try to read the collective mind of Congress is almost irresistible. This urge is greatly accentuated when, as here, there is
an absence of the usual legislative indicia. The committee reports are
62. Allen v. Allen, 111 Fla. 733, 150 So. 237 (1933).
63. Vance v. Vance, 143 Fla. 513, 197 So. 128 (1940); FLA.

STAT.

§65.15

(1962).
64. See Annots., 58 A.L.R. 639 (1927), 109 A.L.R. 1068 (1987).
65. Absent a statutory provision to this effect, the reason usually given for adhering to the general rule is that the prior agreement merges into the divorce decree,
thereby losing its contractual nature. See Annot., 166 A.L.R. 679 (1947) for cases
so holding.
66. Dix v. Dix, 140 Fla. 91, 191 So. 205 (1939); Fowler v. Fowler, 112 So. 2d
411 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
67. Kosch v. Kosch, 113 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1959), conformed to 114 So. 2d 18
(3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
68. 341 U.S. 384, 395-96 (1951) (concurring opinion).
69. 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (concurring opinion).
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completely silent as to the reasons for adoption of the "installment""periodic" dichotomy. Thus, the congressional analyst has no limitations
on his diagnosis of congressional intentions.
Courts, nevertheless, have struggled, and no doubt will continue to
struggle, with the basic problem of alimony legislation. To date, the
judicial disposition of the problem and the Treasury's adoption thereof,
seems to demonstrate the danger of the legislature's failure to express its
principal purpose, either within the statute itself, or within the standard
sources of legislative history-the committee reports. It is submitted
that this leads to the mere utilization of mechanical rules, which are applied with too broad a brush; consequently, some cases are covered that
really lie outside the underlying policy factors that led to the original
legislation.
In this respect, the only clear guides applicable to the problem of
alimony payments over a period of less than ten years are:
(1) Congress intended, in 1942, to change existing law-not
merely clarify it.70
(2) Congress dealt with incidents of a legal relationship and
proceeding that is peculiarly within the province of the several
7
states. '
(3)The usual local law concept of alimony is a payment by the
husband, from his current income, of the current living expenses of
the wife.72 This is to be contrasted with a lump sum payment to the
wife, which is designed to permit her to create her own income in
73
the future to pay her then current expenses.
Thus, it is fairly clear that section 71 contains some distinction between the lump sum payment "and the month to month kind of payment
for support, in which the Congress was seeking relief for alimony-paying
ex-husbands." 74 In attempting to conclude why Congress placed such an
onus on 'lump sum" payments, one should not lose sight of the arguments presented by Randolph Paul7 5 in pressing Congress to adopt the
alimony provisions. Paul was concerned with the taxpayer who was paying alimony out of income and the wife who was receiving a portion of
this income to meet current expenses. There would be an entirely differ-

70. See note 20 supra.
71. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 233 (1945).
72. Floydv. Floyd, 91 Fla. 910, 108 So. 896 (1926); Bredin v. Bredin, 89 So. 2d
353 (Fla. 1956).
73. FLA. STAT. §65.08 (1962) provides that the court may award permanent
alimony in a lump sum.
74. Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 349, 353 (3d Cir. 1953). (Emphasis added.)
75. See text at notes 7 and 8 supra.
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ent result, however, if the husband made a transfer of "capital' to the
wife who had to generate her own "income with which to meet current
expenses.
At the extremes, the factual situations give no problems. If a husband
were ordered to pay his wife $200 per month so long as she lives, we
should have no difficulty squaring this with the policy of "periodic"
payments. Thus, with high tax rates, a husband who continually paid
such alimony without a deduction suffered an extreme financial burden
when the alimony was combined with his taxes. Also, $200 per month for
life is clearly a shifting of the husband's current income to the wife for
her current expenses. On the other hand, if the husband were ordered to
pay the wife $50,000 semiannually for three years, one should have no
difficulty squaring this with a policy of not requiring the wife to include
the money in her gross income and of not allowing the husband the
corresponding deduction. It is clear that, in the usual case, this is not a
division of the husband's income. In addition, the high tax rates would
wipe out a great deal of 'the economic benefit received by the wife.
Finally, such a payment, even over three years, greatly resembles a
transfer into trust, which, under the most favorable pre-1942 decision,
would only have caused the income earned on such a sum to be taxed
to the wife and would have provided no corresponding deduction to the
husband. It should also be noted that if the husband can pay out this
sum of money in such a manner, then Randolph Paurs arguments as to
financial and economic worries are not applicable. A question to keep
in mind, when reviewing the judicial holdings and the regulations in
this area, is whether this last result should be any different simply because the three-year payments are contingent on subsequent events.
Thus, if the decree provides that the husband pay the wife $50,000
semiannually for three years unless the wife dies or remarries, are the
policy considerations any different? The high tax rates would still greatly
reduce the wife's monetary and economic benefit; the semiannual payments are still comparable to a transfer into trust; and the husband in
such a case is not affected by the tax considerations that, in part, led to
the adoption of section 71. Seemingly, the only change is the possibility
that the wife will receive less money in less time.
Factual situations similar to the one found in Smith's Estate V. Commissioner,76 cause difficulty when placed between the policy factors that
seemingly underlie the taxation of alimony, and the broad holdings of
the courts and the regulations in this area. In that case, the decree contained three different schedules of cash payments to the wife:
(1) twenty-five thousand dollars over five years in ten equal
semiannual installments (February 1947 to August 1951),
76. Supranote 67.
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(2) three hundred dollars every month for a period of five years
from December 1946,
(3) one hundred dollars every month, beginning December 1,
1951, for the wife's life.
The decree further provided that all of the above payments would cease
upon either the death of the husband, remarriage of the wife, or the
death of the wife.
At the outset it should be noted that, under the current state of the
law, all of the above payments, because each is subject to the contingencies of death and remarriage, would be "periodic" and thus included in
the wifes gross income. Yet, in deciding Smith's Estate,the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, one year prior to the adoption of the regulations under
section 71, arrived at a partially different result.
Although recognizing the Baker"" decision, the court held the rule
announced therein did not apply to the twenty-five thousand dollars to
be paid over five years in ten equal semiannual installments:7 8
The Baker case is important and will be discussed below. But we
find nothing in it to change what seems to us an obvious installment payment under this contractto a "periodic"payment.
The government sought to extend this argument to the payment of
three hundred dollars every month for five years. The court held, however, that these payments were "periodic." Two reasons were given.
First, the rationale of Baker was adopted. Thus, because of the contingencies of death and remarriage, the promise to pay was not one
which could be mathematically calculated as a certain obligation of the
husband.
79
The court stated its second reason as follows:
Furthermore we do not read into the statute a requirement that
the terms of payment must run over ten years in order that this
become a periodic contract. . . .It seems to us that this set of
facts calls for a fairly clear application of the distinction indicated
in section [71], which provides for both the lump sum payment,
on which it would be quite unfair to tax the wife, and the monthto-month kind of payment for support, in which Congress was
seeking relief for alimony paying ex-husbands.
It is submitted that the Third Circuit propounded a clear statement of
the principles that should control when the problem arises whether
alimony payments for less than ten years should be labeled "periodic' or
77. 205 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1953).
78. Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 67, at 853. (Emphasis added.)
79. Ibid.
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"installment"-albeit, they may be difficult to apply under certain circumstances. If the payments represent a transfer of capital-$15,000 over
two taxable years 80-they should be held "installment" payments. On the
other hand, if the payments represent a division of the husband's current
income for the month to month support of 'the ex-wife-$800 per month
for five years-they should be held "periodic."
The Treasury's pronouncements and most of the cases, however,
have gone much further by resorting to the mathematical certainty test.
The regulations, revenue rulings, and cases, by merely following this
test without further examination of the facts, have arrived at results
which clearly do violence to the statutory provisions for taxing alimony.
Thus, as noted above, the $25,000 payment in Smith would today be
held "periodic," despite the fact that it is the clearest case of a lump sum
transfer of capital.
Congress should lift its veil of silence and make clear just what was
intended when it drafted the "installment"-"periodic" dichotomy. Its
silence only adds instability to an area of the law which by its very
nature contains more than enough friction and emotional disturbance.
Prior to the Baker decision, it was possible to shift the tax burdens of
divorce according to the wishes of 'the parties simply by making the
installments cover more or less than ten years. With the adoption of the
Baker rationale, it has been suggested that flexibility in negotiating
divorce settlements has been reduced. 81 Furthermore, because of the
broad judicial decisions and the Treasury's reasoning in this area, certain
monetary transactions are being taxed in a manner seemingly contrary
to Congress' intent in drafting section 71 and its predecessor section
22(k). Despite the fact 'that no great federal monetary collections are
at stake and that a change in the alimony provisions will have no great
effect on the economy, 2 Congress should amend section 71 to make its
intent clearly ascertainable.
Periodfor Installment Is More Than Ten Years. On the assumption
that a line must be drawn somewhere, it may be pointed out that the
80. The schedule of payments approved in Cocalis v. Cocalis, 103 So. 2d 230

(3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958). Approval was granted under FLA. STAT. §65.08 which allows
the award of "permanent alimony" in a lump sum. Despite this label it is submitted
that the payments represent a transfer of capital to the wife who must generate her
future income (or part of it) from the fund. Thus, the payments in Cocalis should
be non-deductible by the husband and non-taxable to the wife. Yet, the result is
just the opposite; the payments are deductible by the husband and includible in the
wife's gross income.
81. Rosenfeld, Draftinga Property Settlement Agreement Under the 1954 Code:
Part1, U. So. CAL. 1956 TAx INsT. 675, 683-84.
82. Seemingly a primary test for any changes in the Internal Revenue Code. See
President Kennedy's Tax Message. CCH 1963 STAm. FED. T&x R.E'., Spec. 1,
Jan. 24, 1963.
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policy factors that led to Congress' refusal to require the wife to include
lump sum "installment" payments for a period of less than ten years in
83
her gross income, are not present if the period exceeds ten years.
84
Consequently, Congress has provided, in general, that "installment"
payments for a period of more than ten years will be treated as "periodic." Section 71(c) (2), which so provides, must be followed with extreme caution. If not, what started out as an arrangement that would
require the wife to include the amount in gross income and give the
husband a deduction, could very well end up as one that allows him
no deduction.
The subsection requires, in part, that the principal sum must be one
that "is to be paid or may be paid over a period ending more than ten
years from the date of [the] decree, instrument or agreement. "8 5 Consequently, care must be exercised in drafting the beginning and ending
dates of the payment period or a question may arise as to the computation of the required period.8 6 The following two cases, although resolved
in favor of the taxpayer, point up the problem of drafting the beginning
and ending dates.
Suppose a husband and wife entered into a contract, on February 27,
1961, preparatory to and in contemplation of a settlement of their marital difficulties. The contract provides that the husband is to pay the wife
$120,000 in the following manner: $7,500 on or before March 1, 1962
and a like sum on or before the first day of March in each and every year
thereafter with a final $52,500 payment on or before March 1, 1971. The
divorce decree specifically incorporating the contract8' is signed on
February 28, 1961 and recorded March 2, 1961. If February 28 is the
controlling starting date, the ten-year rule poses no obstacle; however,
if March 2 controlled, the payments were over a period of less than ten
years and not includible in the wife's gross income. In Blum v. Commissioner8 8s the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held the payments deductible on two grounds: (1) The judgment or decree in Illinois was
83. Although some argument can be made for adopting a shorter period of time.
84. ITrr. REv. CoDnE or 1954, §71(c) (2).
85. The regulations provide that if a principal sum is payable over a period
longer than ten years but subject to the contingencies of death, remarriage, or economic condition, the sum is to be regarded as "periodic" without regard to the
requirements and limitations of §71(c) (2). See Treas. Reg. §1.71-1(d) (3) (i) (c)
(1957).
86. See Rich, Avoiding Tax Traps in Making Alimony Arrangements,N.Y.U. 7H
INST. ON FED. TAx. 849 (1949).
87. See Commissioner v. Newman, 248 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1957), affrming 26
T.C. 717 wherein the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held the payments "installment" because the divorce decree failed to incorporate a prior property settlement
agreement.
88. 177 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1949), reversing 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 798 (1948).
See also Estate of Spicknall v. Commissioner, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9179 (8th Cir.
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effective the moment it was pronounced or entered by the court; consequently, the period running from the decree to the last payment exceeded ten years. (2) The obligation to pay arose from the contract;
therefore, the time requirement was met.
An even more startling exaniple of how this subsection can bring
forth results opposite from those contemplated by the parties was present in Reis v. United States.8 9 In that case a Kansas divorce decree entered on March 24, 1947 required the husband to pay $86,000 to his
ex-wife-$300 per month "commencing April 1, 1947." The court found
that under Kansas law, the decree made the monthly payments due on
the first day of each month, but payable without default at any time up
to and including the last day of each month. Consequently, because the
last monthly payment was not finally due until March 31, 1957, the
court found that the requirement of more than ten years from date of
decree had been fulfilled.
Both taxpayers and the commissioner immediately learned what a
"tax difference" the wording of a decree can make. Thus a decree requiring 120 monthly payments on the first day of each calendarmonth" was
held 0 not susceptible of an interpretation, similar to Reis, which allowed payment without default at any time up to and including the last
day of the month. On the other hand, a decree ordering 120 monthly
payments beginningon the 10th day of July 1951 was construed as91 not
requiring payment on July 10; rather, the court held that the first payment was dueAugust 10, 1951.92
In conjunction with this ten-year-period requirement, the Tax
Court 9 3 was called upon to interpret the word "may" in the phrase "is to
be paid or may be paid over a period ending more than ten years...."
The taxpayer argued that if he failed to make the required payments,
any balance due would, under the agreement, have to be paid from the
proceeds of his life insurance. He further argued that inasmuch as payment from such proceeds could not be made until he died there was a
possibility it might be paid more than ten years from the date of the
decree. The court held against the taxpayer, and simply recognized the
ever-present possibility "that a divorced husband may not comply with
the terms of a separation agreement." Nevertheless, the court concluded
1961), reversing18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1029 (1959).
89. 214 F.2d 327 (10th Cir. 1954).
90. John A. Isfal%24 T.C. 497 (1955).
91. Lillard v. Wiseman, 57-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9298 (W.D. Okla. 1956); cf.
John W. Furrow, Jr., 34 T.C. 931 (1960), aff'd 61-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9587 (1oth Cir.
1961).
92. The court was assisted in such a finding, however, by a nune pro tune order
of the Oklahoma state court clarifying the original decree by deleting the "10th day
of July" as the starting date and inserting "loth day of August" in its place.
93. Robert D. Stecker, 81 T.C. 749 (1959).
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that, "the statute does not . . . recognize the possibility of noncompliance as a factor to be taken into consideration in determining the
period during which payments of a principal sum are to be paid." 4
Once he hurdles this ten-year rule, the taxpayer has only one more major
obstacle to conquer. Although "installment" payments over more than
ten years will be treated as "periodic," such will be the case only for a
maximum of ten per cent of the principal sum in any one taxable year
of the wife.95 Thus, suppose a divorce decree requires the husband to
pay the wife $150,000 ($20,000 per year for five years and then $5,000
per year for ten years).9 During each of the five years she receives $20,000, the wife will include only $15,000 in her gross income-that is, ten
per cent of the principal sum of $150,000. The husband's corresponding
deduction will be limited to $15,000.97 This result seems to tie in with
the policy of preventing a husband from manipulating the payments so
as to receive a greater tax benefit from a large deduction in one year,98
thereby causing the wife to pay high taxes, and reducing the economic
benefit she receives from the alimony.
ArrearageAlimony Payments. Arrearage alimony payments seem to
be an exception to the "ten per cent of the principal sum" rule. Section
71(c) (2) discusses the tax effects of arrearage payments in an inferential and backhanded manner. The last sentence of the subsection points
out that any part of the principal sum received in one tax year, "which is
allocable to a period after" the taxable year in which it is received is to
be treated as an installment payment for the year received. Therefore,
by inference, payments to the wife that are allocable to years priorto the
'taxable year in which paid, if otherwise deductible in those years, are
deductible in full in the year paid and must be included in the wife's
gross income. 99 Thus, suppose a decree ordered the husband to pay the
wife $100,000-$5,000 per year for twenty years. Clearly, the $5,000
would be treated as "periodic" within the "ten per cent of principal sum"
rule. Suppose, however, the husband fails to make the $5,000 payment in
each of -twoyears. In the third year, however, he pays $15,000 (current
94. Id. at 752.
95. This requirement was added to the original House proposals by the Senate
Finance Committee in 1942. S. REP'. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942). INT.
REv. CODE or 1954, §71(c) (2); Treas. Reg.§1.71-1(d)(2) (1957).
96. Treas. Reg. §1.71-1(d)(5) (1957), example 4.
97. In the ten years in which $5,000 is paid, the entire amount is treated as
"periodic."
98. This is to be compared with the tax results when the husband pays arrearages.
See subheading "ArrearageAlimony Payments"infra.
99. Grant v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1953), aflirming 18 T.C. 1013
(1952); Margaret 0. White, 24 T.C. 452 (1955); Rev. Rul. 55-457, 1955-2 Cumr.
BurL. 527; cf. Frank J. Loverin, 10 T.C. 406 (1948).
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year's payment and two previous years). The entire amount is included
in the wife's gross income and deductible by the husband despite the
fact that the total payment exceeded ten per cent of the principal sum.
This result follows because the delinquent payments would have been
"periodic" if they had been paid in the years when they originally came
00
due.
At first blush it would seem that such a result is squarely in conflict
with the policy underlying the ten-year rule on "installment" payments.
On reflection, however, it is to be noted that the wife can avail herself
of the power of a state court in order to prevent her husband from being
in arrears. Consequently, in the usual case, the husband's failure to make
payments was not motivated solely by a desire to secure a larger single
deduction in one year and thus he should not be penalized by the loss
of a deduction. Be that as it may, it is dear that the wife is paying a
larger tax than if the husband had made the payments on schedule.
Perhaps a new code section is in order. Such a section would allow the
wife to compute her tax in the year of receipt of arrearages by paying
the lesser of the tax on the income for the taxable year with the arrearage
payments included, or the tax payable if the arrearages had been received in the proper taxable years. 1 1
Payment of the Ex-Wifes Taxes. Problems in computing the "principal sum" can arise in other ways. Thus, suppose a decree entered January 1, 1961 required the husband to pay 'the ex-wife $12,000 per year for
twelve years and further requires the husband to pay the tax cost of
receipt of such an amount by the wife.102 For the taxable year 1961, the
ex-wife would include $12,000 in her gross income paying a tax of
$2,804,103 and the husband would take a deduction of $12,000. In the
taxable year 1962, the ex-wife would include in gross income the $12,000
alimony for 1962 plus the $2,804 tax for 1961 which the husband paid
on or before April 15, 1962. The husband, meanwhile, for 1962 would
take a deduction of $14,804, the alimony plus the tax paid. 10 4 In 1963
the husband would pay $12,000 plus the income tax generated by the
100. See last sentence of Treas. Reg. §1.71-1(d) (2) (1957). See also Rev. Rul.
55-457, 1944-2 Ctm. BuirL. 527.
101. Cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,

§§1301-07; Hazel Potter, CCH Tax Ct. Mem.

Dec. 25,939(M) (1963).
102. See Muriel Dodge Neeman, 18 T.C. 397, aff'd per curiam 200 F.2d 560
(2d Cir. 1952) in which the court held that an agreement by the husband to pay the
tax due on his ex-wife's alimony is not binding on the commissioner and cannot
prevent him from determining the amount of taxes due from the ex-wife.
103. Assuming no other gross income, the standard deduction and one exemption

for herself.
104. See Mahana v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl. 1950), cert. denied
339 U.S. 978 (1950). This case demonstrates that if the husband is to pay a stated
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payment of $14,304 in 1962. Each succeeding year the amount paid by
the husband would increase in this manner. Therefore, in a year when
the husband would pay over $14,400,105 the excess over ten per cent of
the principal sum due to his payment of the wife's taxes is deductible in
full as a "periodic" payment that is subject to the contingency of the
wife's yearly taxable income. Such a contingency prevents a principal
sum from being mathematically calculable; consequently, under the
Baker rationale these amounts for taxes are deductible without regard
to the installment payment rule.
From the above result it is clear that an alimony decree can contain
both "periodic" and "installment" payments. 10 6 In drafting a divorce
settlement in Florida, however, one should not rely on the tax cases on
this point. Florida has held that if a divorce decree provides for payment
of permanent alimony in a series of periodic payments, a lump sum
award may not also be granted.'0 7
Support of Minor Children.If the terms of the divorce decree, sepa-

ration agreement, or decree for support "fix . ..a sum . ..payable
for the support of the minor children of the husband," such sum is not
includible in the wife's gross income nor deductible by the husband.'08
Until recently, the word "fix" was the cause of constant tax litigation.
The litigation culminated in Lester v. Commissioner.1 9 In that case, the
divorce decree, after setting forth the payments to be made by the hus0
band, further provided: 11
In the event that any of the children [of which there were three]
of the parties hereto shall marry, become emancipated or die,
then the payments herein specified shall on the happening of
each such event be reduced in a sum equal to one-sixth of the
payments which would thereafter otherwise accrue and be payable in accordance with the terms and provisions hereof.
sum annually plus the wife's tax thereon, the latter amount as well as the former
will be alimony deductible by the husband and taxable to the wife. Cf. Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
105. Ten per cent of the $144,000 principal sum.
106. The courts have never had difficulty in finding within the same divorce decree amounts that would be subject to the "installment" payment rule and amounts
that would be classified "periodic." See Edward Bartsch, 18 T.C. 65 (1952) aff'd per
curiam 208 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1958); James M. Fidler, supra note 49; Alton F.
Lounsbury, 37 T.C. 163 (1961). There is, of course, no question of deductibility of
amounts paid for the wife's taxes if the principal payments are periodic. See Rev.
Rul. 58-100, 1958-1 Cum. BuLL. 31.
107. Harrison v. Harrison, 115 So. 2d 709 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
108. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §71(b).
109. 366 U.S. 299 (1961), affirming 279 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1960), reoersing
32 T.C.1156 (1959).
110. Jerry Lester,32 T.C.1156,1157 (1959).
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Other than naming them joint beneficiaries of an insurance policy,
the decree contained no other provision for the minor children. Despite
this fact, the commissioner contended, and the Tax Court agreed,"'
that the decree "fixed" one-half of all the payments made to the wife
as sums "payable for the support of [the] minor children of such
2
husband.""
The Supreme Court held, however, that Congress intended that the
agreement must specifically state" 3 the amounts or parts thereof allocable to the support of the minor children of the husband in order for the
payments to be within section 71(b). 114 In the opinion, the Court specifically noted that under the laws of some states the wife would be
required to use the unspecified child support payments for the support
of such child. It further recognized, however, that Congress intended to
produce uniformity in the treatment of amounts paid, regardless of the
variance in the laws of different states.
As noted by Justice Clark in the Lester opinion, support payments
for the minor children of 'the parties pursuant to section 71(b) can give
the parties some flexibility. Thus, having arrived at the amount of the
"periodic" payments, the parties may reduce the wife's tax liability by
fixing a portion of the payments for support of the minor children."15
The problem of stating the amount allocable for child support in
decrees can be prevented in Florida. A decree should award separate
amounts for alimony and for support of the minor children." x6 Indeed,
although an undivided award for alimony and child support is not void,
each party is entitled to request, at any time, an allocation of a specific
amount for alimony and for child support."17
If an amount is specifically stated to be for the support of minor
children, in addition to "periodic payments," any payment that does not
111. Jerry Lester, 32 T.C. 1156 (1959), reted 279 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1960).
112. The commissioner's position on this point had previously been adopted in
Metcalf v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 288 (1st Cir. 1959) and Eisinger v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied 353 U.S. 958 (1957) which
deviated from the commissioner's position. The commissioner agreed to follow Weil
when similar facts were present. Rev. Rul. 59-93, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 22.
113. "It [the code section] does not say that 'a sufficiently clear purpose on the
part of the parties is sufficient to shift the tax. It [the code section] says that the
'written instrument' must 'fix' that 'portion of the payment' which is to go to the
support of the children." Lester v. Commissioner, supra note 109, at 303.
114. INT. 1Ev. CoDE. oF 1954. Actually the case involved Int. Rev. Code of
1939, §22(k).
115. Mere support payments to a child, alone, do not guarantee the husband
the right to take the six hundred dollar exemption allowed by §151(e). The husband
must provide "over half' of such support before he can take the exemption. See INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §152(a).
116. Hardy v. Hardy, 118 So. 2d 106 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
117. Zalka v. Zalka, 100 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1958).
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equal the total amount due will be allocated first to the support payment
-that is, not includible in the wife's gross income." 8
It should be noted that if the wife receives support payments for a
person other than minor children of the husband, the payments are
fully taxable to her, regardless of allocation.""
Miscellaneous Considerations.The "alimony" provisions of the Internal Revenue Code may be applicable in instances other than decrees
of divorce or legal separation. Thus, payments made by a husband under
a written separation agreement may be subject to taxation.120 The
same is true of payments received by a wife who is separated from
under a decree requiring the husband to make support
her husband
12 1
payments.
If the husband and wife are not divorced or legally separated under
a judicial decree, they are still considered husband and wife for income
tax purposes.' 2 2 Consequently, if the husband's alimony payments are
not made pursuant to a decree of divorce or legal separation, the husband and wife are subject to the rules concerning the election of the
standard deduction.123 Therefore, if the husband deducts "periodic"
alimony payments, made pursuant to either section 71(a) (2) or (3), the
wife must compute her taxable income by itemizing her deductions
rather than by taking the standard deduction.' 2 4 Furthermore, if for
some reason the husband elects the standard deduction rather than
itemizing his specific deductions,2 5five hundred dollars is the maximum
standard deduction for the wife.'

Finally, it should be noted that "alimony" payments under the legal
relationships set forth in section 71(a) (2) or (8), do not prevent the
husband and wife from electing to file a "joint return."

2 6

If such an

includible
election is made, however, the "alimony" payments are neither
27
in the income of the wife nor deductible by the husband.1
LrE INsuRANcE PRmrMs As AiamoNY

A divorce decree may provide for assignment to the wife of a life
CODE: OF 1954, §71(b); Martha J. Blyth, 21 T.C. 275 (1953).
119. Treas. Reg. §1.71-1(e) (1957); cf. Mandel v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 382
(7th Cir. 1956).
120. In'r. REv. CODE or 1954, §71(a) (2).

118. INT.REv.

121. INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, §71(a) (3).
122. INr. R-xv. CODE Or 1954, §§143(2), 153(2), 6013(d) (2).
123. See generally INT.REv. CODE. OF 1954, §§141-45.
124. IN. REv. CODE OF 1954,§§63(a), 142(a).
125. INT.REv. CODE OF 1954, §141.

126. INT.REv. CODE OF 1954, §6013(d).
127. r.REv. CODE OF 1954, §§71(a) (2)-(3).
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insurance policy on the husband's 12life.
If the policy is paid-up, the
8
problem of taxability does not arise.
Suppose, however, the husband is required not only to transfer the
policy to the wife but also to continue to make the premium payments.
The result seems to depend on the outcome of the interplay between the
doctrine of "constructive receipf' and the alimony provisions. Under the
doctrine of constructive receipt, if A pays the premiums on life insurance
policies owned by B; then, assuming no gift, B must include in his gross
income an amount equal to the premiums paid on the policies. 1 29
Thus, if 'the divorce decree requires the husband to pay the premiums and the husband absolutely assigns the policies to his wife (who
will thereafter irrevocably have all the incidents of ownership), the
premiums will be included in the wife's gross income and can be deducted by the husband. 3 0 On the other hand, if the policy was intended
only to represent security for the payment of alimony, 3 1 or if the interest of the wife in the policy is contingent,-that is she must outlive
her husband-treatment of premiums as alimony payments has been
32
denied'1
It has been suggested that, if fewer than ten annual payments remain
to be paid at the time the husband unqualifiedly assigns the policy to
the wife, the payments will be "installment and not "periodic."' 3 3 Seemingly, however, if the obligation to pay the premiums is subject, either
by decree or by local law, to the contingencies of death, remarriage, or
change in economic circumstances, then such payments will probably
34
be "periodic" and includible in the wife's gross income.
128. Samuel Morrison, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 740 (1956).
129. The rationale underlying this result has been applied by the Treasury to the
portion of an alimony award that is allocated for payment by the wife of insurance
and real estate taxes with respect to property owned by the parties as tenants by the
entirety. Rev. RuL 62-38, 1962-2 Curis. BuLL. 15. This is also true if the property is
held by tenants in common. Rev. Rul. 62-39, 1962-2 Cum.BuLL. 17. Cf. Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929); Hyde v. Commissioner, 62-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 9402 (2d Cir. 1962), affirming 36 T.C. 51 (1961).
180. Hyde v. Commissioner, supra note 129; Lemuel Alexander Carmichael, 14
T.C. 1856 (1950); Anita Quinby Stewart, 9 T.C. 195 (1947); I.T. 4001, 1950-1
Cum. BuLL.
181. Blumenthal v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1950); Beulah Wefl,
22 T.C. 612, 619 (1954), ret'd on other grounds 240 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1957), cert.
denied 853 U.S. 958 (1957).
132. Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 849 (3d Cir. 1953); Florence H.
Griffith, 35 T.C. 882 (1961); I.T. 4001, 1950-1 Ctm. BuLL. 27; Rev. Rul.57-125,
1957-1 Ctr. BuLL. 27 (no deduction for premium payments even though the decree
required husband to pay the premiums, to maintain wife as primary beneficiary, and
precluded husband from borrowing on the policies).
133. Frisch, Divorce and Separation Tax Techniques, N.Y.U. 20T INsT. ON
FED. TAx. 35,40 (1962).
184. See subheading "Tax Courts v. Courts of Appear, supra.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1963

23

LAW
UNIVERSITY
Florida OF
LawFLORIDA
Review, Vol.
16, REVIEW
Iss. 1 [1963], Art.[Vol.
1 XVI

PRoPERTY S~rnraNSmrs
Introduction
Instead of providing for payments over a number of years or for
life, the parties may agree that the husband shall transfer certain property to the wife in exchange for her release of claims for support and
marital rights. It is clear that contracts intended to facilitate or promote
'the procurement of a divorce are contrary to public policy and will not
be enforced. 135 Florida will, however, recognize bona fide agreements
relating to alimony or the adjustment of property rights between husband and wife, even though in contemplation of divorce, "if not directly
conducive to the procurement of a divorce."136
Despite the fact 'that such agreements are recognized and, in most
cases, adopted by the Florida courts, the courts do have the power to
approve, modify, or disapprove of the agreement in its entirety.1a7 However, once a property settlement has been adopted and incorporated in
the divorce decree, it will not, if it is fair and valid on its face, be modified or altered by the courts of Florida. 138
Income Tax Consequences
Generally speaking, the fair market value of property received by the
wife in a property settlement 39 is neither taxable to her14° nor deductible by the husband. 14 1 The courts have recognized, however, that
a decree may contain elements of a property settlement and elements of
"periodic" payments.142 Thus in Thomas E. Hogg,143 the husband paid
135. Callemore v. Gallemore, 94 Fla. 516, 114 So. 371 (1927).
136. 94 Fla. 516, 519, 114 So. 371, 372 (1927); Miller v. Miller, 149 Fla. 722,
7 So. 2d 9 (1942) (if such agreements are "made in good faith, free from fraud,
deceit, or trickery .... ").
137. Florida Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 76 (S.D.
Fla. 1960).
138. Haynes v. Haynes, 71 So. 2d 491, 493 (Fla. 1954). For a case dealing with
the problem whether the stipulation approved in the final decree constituted a
property settlement in connection with divorce or an agreement to pay stated sums at
certain intervals, see Hunter v. Hunter, 108 So. 2d 478 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
139. Property settlement here is not meant to cover the situation in which the
court adjudicates property rights between the parties as an incident to the divorce.
See Picchi v. Picchi, 100 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1958).
140. Treas. Reg. §1.71-1(d) (1957).
141. Treas. Reg. §1.215-1(a) (1957).
142. Although Florida will not allow periodic "alimony" and lump sum alimony
in the same decree, see text at note 107 supra, seemingly the courts will allow a
property settlement and an award of permanent alimony. Fowler v. Fowler, 112
So. 2d411 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
143. 13 T.C. 361 (1949).
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$1,200 monthly for the wife's current annual support and transferred to
her a furnished home, car and other property. The court held that the
$1,200 per month was deductible by the husband and includible in the
wife's gross income; however, the transferred property was treated as a
property settlement.
Until very recently, a lawyer found himself in an uncertain position
when advising clients as to the tax consequences of transferring appreciated property for purposes of a property settlement. The Internal
Revenue Code provides that the gain upon sale or other disposition of
property shall be the excess of the amount realized over the property's
basis. 144 The Code further provides that the "amount realized" is, in
general, the sum of money and the fair market value of any property
145
received on the sale or disposition.
The courts had no difficulty in agreeing that the transfer by the husband, of appreciated property to his wife, in exchange for her release of
claims for support and marital rights, was a taxable event.140 The difficulty arose in attempting to assign a value to the "amount realized" by
the husband. Mesta 4 7 and Haliwel'14s held that the amount realized
was equal to the value of the property transferred to the wife. Marshman,' 49 on the other hand, held that the rights given up by the wife
were dependent upon so many uncertain factors as to make it impossible
to place a fair market value on the property she transferred.
Recently, certiorari was granted in a case' ° decided by the Court of
Claims "a la Marshman."'5 ' In U.S. v. Davis,152 the Supreme Court held
that 'the fair market value of the transferred property was approximately
the value to the husband of his discharged obligation and, therefore, the
fair market value of the property received by him on the exchange. Thus,
if the husband, in exchange for the wife's releasing of her marital rights,
transfers securities that cost him $50,000 and that are now worth $75,000,
he has a gain of $25,000.153 Furthermore, the court concluded that the
value of the property transferred establishes the tax basis for the wife.
144. INT. RBv. CODE Or 1954, §1001(a).
145. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, §1001(b).
146. Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (8d Cir. 1941); Commissioner v.
Halliwell, 181 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942); Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27
(6th Cir. 1960).
147. Supra note 121.
148. Supranote 121.
149. Supra note 121.
150. Davis v. United States, 868 U.S. 818 (1961).
151. Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. C1. 1961).
152. United States v. Davis, 870 U.S. 65 (1962).
153. The nature or character of the gain depends on the nature of the property
transferred. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §1221; cf. Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d

217 (2d Cir. 1940), affirming 40 B.T.A. 824 (1989).
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This harsh result may be mitigated if 'the parties first fix the amount of
the husband's obligation-that is, husband is to pay wife $100,000-and
the husband, assuming the wife agrees, then 'transfers property in
discharge of that obligation. Under these facts, the wife's marital
rights have a value placed on them and should serve as the "amount
realized" rather than fair market value of the property transferred by
154
the husband.
One result of the Davis case is that the transfer of property creates a
taxable gain to the husband, but the transfer produces no cash with
which to pay the resulting taxes. On its face, 'this is a harsh result.
Furthermore, the Davis decision represents another step away from
Congress' intent to tax alimony equally in every state. Thus, property
settlements in community property states will give rise to no taxable
gain.' 55 Congress should consider a new code provision whereby, in
Davis type situations, the husband has no taxable gain on the transfer
and the wife takes his basis for the property received. 15
Such a congressional solution would equate property settlements
with other transactions that Congress has seen fit to treat as nontaxable. 57 Indeed, transfers of property due to divorce have been
likened to involuntary conversions which, pursuant to section 1033,
to treat, under most circumstances, as a nonCongress has 5elected
8
taxable event.'

DEDucrmmnY

OF ArroRNEy's FEEs

It is basic tax law that a taxpayer can take no deduction for "personal
expenses" unless such a deduction is specifically provided for by the
Internal Revenue Code.' 59 Seemingly, therefore, the proposition that
attorneys' fees arising from a divorce suit are non-deductible1 0 should
154. See Aleda N. Hall, 9 T.C. 53 (1947); Cristina deBourbon Patino, 13 T.C.
816 (1949), aff'd 186 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1950).
155. Swanson v. Wiseman, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9264 (W.D. Okla. 1961);
Francis R. Walz, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935).
156. A change in the tax laws recommended by the American Law Institute.
The institute recommended a statutory change under which gain or loss would not
be recognized with respect to the property transferred pursuant to a divorce, separation agreement, anti-nuptial agreement, or other marital settlement, and the wife
would take the husband's basis for the property. A.L.I., Fed. Income Tax Stat. (Feb.
1954 Draft) Vol. I, 868.
157. IT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§1031, 1033, 1034. See Rev. lI. 55-410, 1955-1
Cum. BULL. 297, wherein the Internal Revenue Service agreed not to tax the donor
of a charitable contribution on the appreciated value of the property contributed-a
result which has been affected by P.L. 87-834, §13(d) which added "new" §170(e)
and redesignated "old" 170 (e) as 170 (f).
158. 61 MIcH. L. REv. 612 (1963).
159. INT.REv. CODE OF 1954, §262.
160. Henry Sanderson, 23 B.T.A. 304 (1931); Robert A. McKinney, 16 T.C.
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pose no difficulty. Be this as it may, the law in this area, especially as to
husbands, was formerly unsettled."'
The unsettled condition revolved around the deduction allowed by
the Code "for the production or collection of income and for the management, conservation,
or maintenance of property held for the produc1 62
tion of income."
The wife's right to deduct attorney's fees, has not provided a great
source of difficulty. Thus, that "part of an attorney's fee and of the other
costs paid in connection with a divorce . . . which are properly attributable to the production of collection of amounts includible in gross
income under section 71 are deductible by the wife under section
212."163
As far as husbands are concerned, however, the law, until 1963, was
in a state of flux. The seed of the difficulty was sown by the Eighth
Circuit in Baer v. Commissioner.1 0 4 In that case, the wife demanded
that the husband transfer stock in a controlled corporation. The husband's attorneys negotiated a compromise whereby the husband transferred a certain number of shares to his wife, but he retained the voting
rights and power of disposition over the shares. In allowing a deduction
for that part of the attorneys' fees which could be properly allocated to
the protection of the husband's income producing property, the court
noted: 0 5
[T]hrough the efforts of [his] attorneys ...
[the husband] was
placed in the position to meet [his] obligations and yet remain
in control of the company and his stock therein. In so doing they
were . . . conserving and maintaining property held . . . for
the production of income.
Subsequent to the decision, a conflict of views arose among the courts as
16
to the result reached in the Baer case.
Two recent Supreme Court decisions have put the issue largely at
916 (1951).
161. Baer v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952).
162. INT. Bnv. CODE OF 1954, §§212(1)-(2).
163. Treas. Reg. §1.262-1(b)(7) (1958); Elsie B. Gale, 13 T.C. 661 (1949),
aff'd 191 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1951); Barbara B. LeMond, 13 T.C. 670 (1949). The
rule also holds true as to legal separations, written separation agreements, and
decrees for support. The portion of the wife's attorney's fees allocable to the receipt
of money or property not included in income-that is, property settlements or installment payments-is not deductible. Barbara B. LeMond, supra.
164. 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952).
165. Id. at 650.
166. Compare Owens v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1959); Lewis v.
Commissioner, 253 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1958); Tressler v. Commissioner, 228 F.2d
356 (9th Cir. 1955).
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rest.167 Grounding its decisions on the legislative history of what is now
section 212168 and the judicial decisions prior to its original adoption,
the Court held that'the right to a deduction under section 212 "depends
on whether or not the claim arises in connection with the taxpayer's
profit seeking activities." "It does not depend on the consequences that
might result to a taxpayer's income producing property from a failure to
defeat the claim...."
Thus, the law seems generally settled in this area. The wife may deduct that portion of her attorney's fee allocated to the production of
income-alimony; on the other hand the husband will be unable to
deduct the cost of attorney's fees arising from the usual divorce suit.' 69
It should be noted, however, that the portion of the attorney's fee
allocated for "tax advice or consultation" is still deductible. 17o This tax
advice, however, must be received by the person seeking the deduction
7
and not by the other party to the divorce litigation.' '
Am ONy TRUSTS
72
Introduction1

The 1954 Internal Revenue Code attempted to clarify and bring
together in one subchapter the basic rules as to the taxation of income
earned by a trust.'7 3 Under that chapter, trusts are divided into three
general categories:
74
(1) ordinary trusts,
(2) "grantor trusts"-that is, trusts which are so drafted that the
grantors dominion and control causes, for income tax purposes, the
167. United States v. Gilmore, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9285 (1963), reversing and
remanding 290 F.2d 942 (Ct. Cl. 1961); United States v. Patrick, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9286 (1963), reversing 288 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1961).
168. Int.Rev. Code of 1939, §23(a) (2).
169. Nor will the husband be able to deduct attorney's fees paid to his wife's
attorney. Lewis v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1958), affirming 27
T.C. 158 (1957); United States v. Patrick, supranote 167.
170. Treas. Reg. §1.212-1(1) (1957).

171. United States v. Patrick, supra note 167.
172. This introduction is only for the purpose of setting forth some broad general
rules as to the Internal Revenue Codes treatment of trusts. For this introduction the
author has borrowed heavily from two sources: (1) MICHAELsON, INcomE TA ATxoN
or ESTAES AND ThusTs (rev. ed. 1961) and (2) HUFFAExR, SrTsOTAN & ANGumE,
TAX Pnonmmis OF !DFucAmns (1961).
178. INT. REv. CODE

OF

1954 ch. 1, subchapter J. Some feel that Congress did

not achieve a sufficient amount of clarity. See Lauritzen, We Must Simplify the
Taxation of Estates and Trusts, 49 A.B.A.J. 146 (1963).
174. See INT.REv.CODE OF 1954, §641.
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income to be taxed to the grantor and the corpus to be regarded as
75
still owned by him also,1
(3) trusts created for special situations.1 76
Ordinary trusts are taxed on any income that is neither distributed
nor distributable to the beneficiaries. Generally, the trust will be taxed
as though it were an individual. 17 7 A deduction is allowed the trust,
however, for any income that is distributed or distributable to the
beneficiaries. 178 The amount so deducted by the trust is taxable to the
beneficiary, 17 9 and in his hands the income retains any special characteristic-that is dividend, capital gain, et cetera-it may have had when
80
received by the trust.'
Whether an alimony trust, or the wife as beneficiary thereof, will be
taxed, as generally outlined above, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is a surprise 181 to some practitioners to find
that there are two types of alimony 'trusts, each with propensities to
different income tax consequences. On the one hand there are "section
71" trusts, consisting of those created either under a separation agreement or pursuant to or in contemplation of a decree of separation or
divorce, and, under certain circumstances pre-existing trusts. On the
other hand, a pre-existing trust may give rise to a "section 682" trust.
Section 71 Trusts
It has been suggested that there are at least four advantages to be
derived by providing for "periodic payments" through the use of a
182
"section 71" trust:
(1) Secure the advantage of "periodic payments" to the husband
by providing that the payments to the wife will cease upon the happening of a certain event.
(2) The husband can satisfy his obligation out of the trust income while providing for the return of trust corpus to him or his
estate at such time as the payments cease.
(8) The wife's worries as to any fluctuations in the husband's
income are generally obviated.
175. See INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, §§671-78.
176. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §401 (pension trusts), §682 (alimony trusts).

177. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §641(a).
178. I=T. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§651, 666.
179. NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §61(a) (15).
180. Tr. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§652(b), 662(b).
181. Frisch, Divorce and Separation Tax Techniques, N.Y.U. 20m
FED. TAx. 35 (1962).

INs.

ON

182. Comment, 66 YA.E L.J. 881 (1957).
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(4) The wife is generally freed from the hardship of enforcing
compliance with the monetary portion of the alimony decree.
In requiring the wife to include "periodic payments" of alimony in
her gross income, the Code provides that such payments are includible
even if attributable to property transferred in trust. 8 3 For example,
assume a divorce decree requires the husband to pay his wife $500 per
month until she dies or remarries. To meet this obligation, the husband
creates a trust and provides: up to $500 per month shall be paid to the
wife until she dies or remarries, the trustee may invade corpus to the
extent the income is insufficient to provide the $500, and upon the wife's
death or remarriage the property is to return to -thehusband.
Because it was created "in discharge of an obligation imposed upon
the husband [and] made specific under the court . . . decree
...
divorcing . . . the husband and wife," the trust is a "section 71"
trust.18 4 The tax consequences of such a trust will be dissimilar to those
arising under ordinary trusts. The wife will be taxed at ordinary income
tax rates on all payments made by the trust, whether from corpus or
income and regardless of the character of the income in the hands of
the trust. 85 Needless to say, the husband will receive no deduction for
1 80
any amounts paid out by the trust.
A "section 71" trust may arise in another way. If, before any divorce
or separation agreement is contemplated, the husband had created such
a trust for his wife, he would be required to include in his income any
amounts paid to the wife under the trust.1.87 If the parties are subsequently divorced, however, and the decree incorporates the trust for
the purpose of alimony, the tax results are diametrically opposite. Here,
payments from a previously created trust are used in discharge of an
88
obligation imposed upon the husband under the court's decree.
Consequently, the husband will no longer be taxed upon the income
from the trust and the wife will be required to include the payments
from the trust in her gross income, whether such payments are derived
from trust corpus or income.' 8 9 Similar tax consequences result if the
183. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§71(a) (1)-(2). Section 71(a) (3) seems to require that the payments be made directly from the husband to the wife.
184. Treas. Reg. §l.682(a)-1(a) (2) (1957).
185. Treas. Reg. §1.71-1(c)(3) (1957); Muriel Dodge Neeman, 26 T.C. 864
(1956), aff'd per curiam 255 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied 358 U.S. 841
(1958).
186. INT. Rrv. CODE: OF 1954, §§71(d), 215.
187. rr. REV. CODE OF 1954, §677(b).
188. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §71(d); Rev. RUl. 57-506, 1957-2 CUm. BuLL. 65.
189. Treas. Reg. §1.682(a)-l(a)(2) (1957); Muriel Dodge Neeman, 13 T.C.
397 (1949), aff'd per curiam 200 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1952). The result would be the
same if the parties were legally separated pursuant to a decree or written separation
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payments are made, incident to the court decree or written separation
agreement, by a trust of which the husband is the beneficiary.1 90
Section 682 Trusts
The regulations, and the fact that there is a paucity of judicial decisions to the contrary, have resulted in a severe restriction of the situations in which a "section 682" alimony trust can arise. For such a trust
to exist, two factors, in addition to a divorce, legal separation, or separation under a written agreement, must be present:
(1) Except for section 682, the trust income would be taxable to
the husband. 191
(2) The trust was in existence prior to the divorce, legal separation, or separation under a written agreement
and was not created in
19 2
events.
such
to
incident
or
contemplation
If before a divorce or a separation is contemplated, the husband
creates a trust to pay his wife $1,000 a month and retains the right to
revoke the trust at any time, it is clear that the income from the trust
will be taxed to the husband and not to the wife.193 Should the husband
and wife become divorced and the decree fail to award any alimony out
of the trust or incorporate the trust into the decree, the trust would become a "section 682" trust. Consequently, the wife, and not the husband,
would incur any individual tax consequences arising out of the receipt
of trust distributions.19 4 Under these circumstances, however, the normal trust rules will apply; therefore, the wife will be taxed only on distributions from the trust up to the trusts distributable net income for the
tax year.195 Furthermore, the income will retain, in the wife's hands, any
special characteristic it would have had in the trust's or husband's
hands.' 9 6 These results will in no way be different if, instead of creating
the trust, the husband was the beneficiary of a trust and assigned his
97
rights thereunder to his wife.1
agreement. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §71(a)(2); Treas. Reg. §1.682(a)-(a)(2)
(1957).
190. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §682; Treas. Reg. §1.682(a)-1(a)(3) (1957).
191. INT. 1,Ev.CODE OF 1954, §682(a).
192. Young v. Hassett, 68 F. Supp. 943 (D. Mass. 1946); Treas. Reg. §1.682(a)l(a)(4) (1957), examples 1 and 2.
193. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §676(a).
194. Young v. Hassett, supra note 192; Treas. Reg. §1.68 2 (a)(1)-(a)(4)
(1957), example 2.
195. Treas. Reg. §1.682(a)-1(a)(2) (1957).
196. Anita Quinby Stewart, 9 T.C. 195 (1947).
197. Anita Quinby Stewart, supra note 196; Treas. Reg. §1.682(a)-1(a)(3)

(1957).
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Support for Minor Children
The payments to the wife, from an alimony trust-whether "section
71" or "section 682"-may be "fixed"19 8 for the support of the minor
children of the parties. If so, any portion of payments "fixed," is not includible in the wife's gross income.' 99 If the income from the trusts
would have been taxed to the husband except for the alimony provisions,
then that portion of the trust's payments "fixed" for the support of the
minor children of the parties is includible instead in the husband's gross
income.

20 0

CONCLusION

We have seen that the many provisions of section 71 must be read
and followed with great care. It will be extremely difficult, without
specifically so providing, to draw an alimony arrangement in Florida
that will allow the husband to complete his financial responsibility over
a period of less than ten years, and at the same time prevent an income
tax burden on the wife. This, despite the fact that Congress clearly
intended that a wife should not be taxed on transfers of capital made
by her husband over a period of less than ten years. Furthermore, in
view of the cases and certain Treasury pronouncements, lump sum "instalmenit payments" over a period of more than ten years will be treated,
because of Florida law, as "periodic payments"; hence, the rule of section 71(c) (2) would seem of little importance to parties divorced in
Florida.
An attorney representing the wife should impress upon her the necessity, from a tax standpoint, of preventing the husband from being in
arrears with the alimony. Arrearages, of sufficient amounts, paid to her
in one tax year, could very well wipe out a large segment of the economic
benefit intended to be guaranteed the wife by the husband's obligation
to pay alimony.
Many divorce decrees attempt to provide for the support of the
minor children of the parties. If the parties have agreed, or the court has
ordered, that this support, including income taxes, shall be the husband's
burden, a proper decree to this effect should be drawn. Thus, the amount
intended for the support of the minor children of the parties must be
separately and specifically stated. One should not attempt to provide
for this support by stipulating that the amount paid to the wife shall
decrease by a certain amount as each child attains his majority. To do so
is tantamount to placing the complete income tax burden caused by the
receipt of these payments on the wife.
The divorce decree may require the husband to transfer certain life
198. See subheading "Support of Minor Children," supra.
199. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §682(a).
200. Treas. Reg. §1.682(a)-1(b) (1957).
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insurance policies to his wife. In addition, the court may require the
husband to pay the premiums. To have these premiums treated as
"periodic" payments-deductible by the husband and includible in the
wife's gross income-the husband must absolutely assign the policies to
his wife and place in her all the incidents of ownership.
The parties may decide that, in lieu of alimony, the husband shall
transfer certain property to the wife in exchange for her release of claims
for support and marital rights. The tax consequences of such a transfer
are governed by sections of the Code other than those specifically dealing with alimony. It is clear that the proceeds of such a settlement are
neither taxable to the wife nor deductible by the husband. On the other
hand, if the husband transfers property to the wife that has a fair
market value in excess of his basis he must recognize the difference as
taxable gain.
As far as the deductibility of attorney's fees incurred in the divorce is
concerned, the tax result depends on which party is seeking the deduction. Clearly the wife may deduct that portion of the attorney's fee
directly connected with securing alimony that is required to be included
in her taxable gross income. The husband, on the other hand, is denied
the right to deduct the costs he incurred in the usual divorce suit; however, he may deduct the attorney's fee for "tax advice or consultation."
The parties may desire to avail themselves of a trust to pay the wife
her alimony. Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the trust is a
"section 71" trust or a "section 682" trust. If the former, all "periodic"
payments to the wife, whether from corpus or income, will be included
in her gross income and will lose any special characteristics which the
income had when earned by the trust. On the other hand, a "section 682"
trust will be taxed pursuant to the normal rules for the taxation of trusts.
Thus, the wife will be taxed on all amounts distributed or distributable
from the trust, not to exceed the "distributable net income" of the trust
for the tax year. Furthermore, the payments will generally carry with
them any special characteristics which the amounts had when earned by
the trust-that is, dividends, capital gains, et cetera.
Many years subsequent to a divorce or property settlement a new
litigant may happen upon the scene. Thus the commissioner may become a vocal third party to a matter that the parties contemplated had
been permanently concluded. This intervention by the Internal Revenue
Service could very well change the monetary and economic results the
parties intended to achieve.
With proper planning at the time of the divorce or separation, such
action by the Internal Revenue Service may be prevented. To achieve
this result, however, an attorney must be thoroughly armed with an
understanding of the applicable provisions of the Code and the judicial
gloss with which they have been covered.
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